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Abstract. Many “good practices” in computer security are based on as-
sumptions and local evidence that do not generalize. There are few quan-
tifiable methods of establishing or refuting the validity of these practices
from a user perspective. We propose a formal model of security policies
that allows us to evaluate the claimed benefits to the user of the system
quantitatively. We illustrate the use of the model by looking at a security
policy we all live with daily: The Password Policy.
1 Introduction
There are many myths in the field of computer security that have a daily effect
on the users of systems. Since there is little in the way of quantitative evaluation
to support or disprove claims about improved security, assumptions are taken as
fact, and we accept discomfort in return for supposed benefit. In most other parts
of the security space, we have strong systems for reasoning about the strength
of the system, but this has not been the case for user level policy. We know that
many security vulnerabilities are due to users not complying with stated policy,
due to a lack of understanding of the value of that policy. A mathematical model
of the security system allows a firm underpinning for discourse with users on the
motivation for the policy.
We use a password policy as an example since it illustrates the concept. To
address questions about the efficacy of such policies, we develop a probabilis-
tic model which captures the way these policies constrain how people choose
passwords, and what this means for system security. Our primary aims with
this model are twofold: 1) clarifying and formalising concepts used when dis-
cussing password policies and the level of security they engender (some concepts
we clarify include password strength and the difficulty an attacker might have in
subverting password security), and 2) exploring new applications of probabilistic
modelling approaches already applied in other contexts, with the aim of gaining
insight into security evaluation.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We begin in Section 2 with
details of how we model a password-based security system that is both subject
to password policies and open to attack from adversaries. Section 3 develops
this further with a discussion of what password strength means in our model. In
Section 4, user implications of our model are explored.
2 Modelling Password Choices and Attacker Actions
In a password-based security system, access to computing resources are controlled
as follows: each user of the system has preassigned access rights to the resources
– we refer to these access rights as a user–profile – and anyone can gain the
access granted in a given user–profile by submitting the password for the user–
profile to the system for authentication. In practice, the system may be viewed
as a collection of software tools that: 1) maintain a database of the one-to-one
correspondence between a user-profile and its related password, and 2) grant
an entity access to a user profile if and only if the entity submits the password
associated with the user-profile.
Naturally, there is a limited amount of computer memory available to the
system for storing each password chosen by its users, where these passwords are
comprised of symbols from a finite character set. Consequently, the set of all
possible passwords, P, is finite and completely defined by the password security
system.
A user of the password security system chooses a password, say pi, from the
typically large set P according to some probability distribution.
The system is open to attack by an attacker. Here, an attacker is any entity
that seeks to subvert the password security system by correctly guessing the
password for a legitimate user, submitting this guess to the password security
system and, thereby, gaining access to those computer resources granted in a
legitimate user–profile. An attack is the choice and submission of a password
to the security system by an attacker. We refer to a collection of attacks by an
attacker as an attack campaign. In conducting an attack campaign, the at-
tacker chooses a sequence of passwords from P at random. Suppose the number
of attacks (that is, the length of such a sequence) is N . Then the sequence of
passwords, which we may refer to as σ, is an ordered N –tuple of passwords, say
(pi1, . . . , piN ). That is, an attack campaign is characterised by some sequence of
passwords σ chosen by an attacker so that:
σ = (pi1, . . . , piN ) ∈ P × P × · · · × P︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
,
We accept the view that an identical amount of time and effort is expended
by the attacker in carrying out each attack in an attack campaign. After all,
attackers have no notion of how much closer they have gotten to correctly guess-
ing a password after a succession of failed attacks, and the act of guessing and
submitting a password to the system does not significantly change from attack
to attack. Formally, therefore, if an attack campaign occurs over regular time-
intervals in calendar time, then the length N of an attack campaign is a measure
of the time and effort spent by the attacker. For the sake of brevity we shall write
the cartesian product above, P × P × · · · × P, as PN .
An attack is deterministic in its outcome: a correctly guessed password by an
attacker compromises the system, while an incorrect guess will not. Therefore,
for each pair of user-password pi and choice of password an attacker submits
to the security system pii, the indicator function ν ( , ) tells us if an attack is
successful; it is defined as follows
ν (pi, pii) =
1, if pi = pii
0, otherwise
A user policy is the set of rules and constraints, imposed on a user of a
password-based security system, which limit both how the user chooses a pass-
word and the length of time for which such a user-password is valid. So, for
instance, a password policy that gives guidance to a legitimate user about how
to choose a “strong” password would be part of the user policy for any user
that follows such guidance. In effect, a user-policy defines a partition of P into
two disjoint subsets – those passwords that a user may choose from, and those
passwords that the user will not choose from. A user policy is partly the re-
sult of system imposed rules for password choices – imposed on the user to
restrict which passwords she can choose – and system imposed time limits for
the validity of a chosen password. In addition, user policy is also the result of
the preferences a user has about how to construct a password, such as using a
combination of letters from the lyrics of a favourite song or the sum of family
members birthdays.
In the same vein, there exist (possibly self-imposed) constraints on an at-
tacker which determine both how the attacker chooses passwords and how long
the attack campaign may last for. We loosely refer to these constraints as an
attacker policy. An attacker-policy partitions P into two disjoint subsets of
passwords: those that an attacker may choose from when conducting a cam-
paign of attacks, and those the attacker will not choose from. The partition
arises naturally because an attacker policy is partly defined by the attacker’s be-
liefs and preferences: for instance, he might take the view that certain passwords
will never be chosen by the user. This limits the potential passwords considered
by the attacker. However, this alone may be insufficient for the attacker’s needs,
given that the typical number of attacks an attacker can carry out is exceed-
ingly small compared with the number of possible passwords a user may have
choose from, so that the attacker’s beliefs still result in a relatively large subset
of passwords to be considered by the attacker. Compound this limitation with
the fact that for many practical systems there is a finite amount of time for
which a user’s password might be valid – so, an attacker has a finite number of
attempts to guess the user’s password – and we see that an attacker would seek
to maximize his probability of correctly guessing a user’s password by focusing
his attacks only on those passwords that he deems a user most likely to choose.
In summary, the attacker policy defines the subset of passwords an attacker
might try, but the attacker still needs to optimize which of these passwords he
should try – an optimization problem that results in a probability distribution
for which passwords the attacker chooses, as we shall see shortly.
A user of the system is required to choose a password, at random, in ac-
cordance with the user policy. For a given user and user policy, let Π be the
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Fig. 1. The overlap of those passwords that may be chosen by a user and those that
may be chosen as part of an attack campaign.
random variable that models the random choice of a password by the user.
Then, P (Π = pi) is the probability that a given password pi is chosen by the
user from P. This defines the distribution of user-password choice, an example
of which is depicted in Fig. 2.
On the other hand, an attacker typically has a limited number of tries to
guess a password, so he chooses each password in an attack campaign according
to his attacker policy and some probability distribution. For a given attacker and
attacker policy, let Πi be the random variable that models the ith random choice
of password made by the attacker for an attack campaign. Then, the probability
that a given potential password, pii, is used in an attack is P (Πi = pii). This is
a distribution of attacker-password choice, an example of which is depicted in
Fig. 3. Actually, more interesting is the probability that a given sequence of
potential passwords, say σ = (pi1, . . . , piN ), is chosen by the attacker to use in a
campaign. In general, this is given by the discrete joint probability distribution
of the random vector Σ = (Π1, . . . ,ΠN ),
P (Σ = σ) = P (Π1 = pi1, . . . ,ΠN = piN ) . (1)
This defines the distribution of the attacker’s attack-campaign choice.
For the campaign to be successful it is sufficient that at least one of the
passwords tried by the attacker is a correct guess; where exactly in the sequence
such a correct guess occurs is unimportant for now. In particular, the probability
that an attack-campaign successfully compromises the system by guessing the
legitimate password pi being used by a given user
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Fig. 2. A distribution that defines, for each password, the probability that the password
is chosen by the user. The random variable is defined on the space of passwords P, and
those passwords that a user will never choose from (according to the user-policy) will
have zero probability associated with them.
is given as:
P
(
ν
(
pi,Σ
)
= 1
)
= E
[
ν
(
pi,Σ
)]
=
∑
σ∈PN
ν
(
pi, σ
)
P (Σ = σ) . (2)
In practice, the precise form of Eq. (2) is influenced by different factors. For
instance, many password-based systems have a maximum placed on the number
of consecutive failed authentication attempts on a user profile. When this number
is reached the user profile is made unavailable for authentication for a period of
time. This limits the length of an attack-campaign carried out by an attacker.
Another example is how some websites use so-called “Captchas” to determine if
a human being is attempting to access the material they contain, as these also
hinder an attackers ability to perform a brute-force attack, thus significantly
reducing the length of an attack-campaign and increasing the effort required by
an attacker.
While our focus is on passwords, the model does not ignore the utility of a
username which, in conjunction with a password, may be viewed as a unique
identifier for a legitimate user of the security system.
The model allows for an asymmetry between a system administrator and an
attacker in what each can learn from a failed login attempt. Usually, failed at-
tempted logins are not informative in indicating to an attacker just how “close”
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Fig. 3. A distribution that defines, for each password, the probability that the password
is chosen by an attacker in an attack. The random variable is defined on the space of
passwords P, and those passwords that an attacker will never choose from (according
to the attacker-policy) will have zero probability associated with them.
the attacker’s wrongly guessed password is to the true password. On the other
hand, a system administrator can compare the incorrect password that was sub-
mitted with the actual password to determine if the two passwords differ by an
insignificant number of characters.
For clarity it has been indicated that a single attacker carries out an attack-
campaign. However, this simplification is not necessary and the model generalizes
easily to cater for multiple attackers.
3 Password Simplicity
When is a password chosen by a user a simple password? A user-password could
be simple for any of the following reasons:
1. The password is chosen from a set of related passwords, where an attacker
armed with some knowledge about this set can deduce what the underlying
relationship between the passwords is. For instance, a symmetrical relation-
ship between the passwords (e.g. they all comprise of some permutation of
the same vowels, consonants and symbols), or a set of simple transformation
rules that gives another password in the set once one of the passwords in the
set is known (e.g. a rule that replaces all ‘s’ characters with the ‘$’ symbol).
2. The password is one of many common passwords known to attackers (e.g.
common phrases such as “password” or “123456 ”).
A user choosing simple passwords potentially increases the probability of an
attacker correctly guessing the user’s password. We can make this notion precise
as follows. For an attacker carrying out a randomly chosen attack-campaign
aimed at accessing a given user-profile, we define the simplicity of a given user-
password for the attacker as the probability that the attacker correctly guesses
the password in a random attack-campaign, if the password is the one associated
with the user-profile. That is, for a user-password pi and a random variableΣ that
models an attacker’s choice of attacks in an attack-campaign (where the length
of the campaign is N), the simplicity of pi for the attacker is computed by Eq. (2)
Let us consider a particular case of this formula. Suppose further that the attacks
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Fig. 4. The overlap of the distributions in Fig.’s 2 and 3 defines the probability that
a randomly chosen user-password is correctly guessed by an attacker. A simple pass-
word would be one for which such an overlap implies an attacker is likely to guess the
password.
in an attack-campaign are independently and identically distributed password
choices made by the attacker, where Πa is the random variable that models the
choice of an attack by an attacker. Then, the simplicity of the password pi for
this attacker is:
E [ν (pi,Σ)] =
∑
σ∈PN
ν (pi, σ)P (Σ = σ)
=
∑
(pi1,...,piN )∈PN
(
1−
N∏
i=1
(1− ν (pi, pii))
)
P (Πa = pi1, . . . , Πa = piN )
=
∑
piN∈P
. . .
∑
pi1∈P
(
1−
N∏
i=1
(1− ν (pi, pii))
)
P (Πa = pi1) . . . P (Πa = piN )
(3)
Note that we can make the following expansion:
1−
N∏
i=1
(1− ν (pi, pii)) =
N∑
i=1
ν (pi, pii) −
N∑
i1<i2
ν (pi, pii1) ν (pi, pii2) + . . .
+ (−1)N
N∑
i1<...<iN−1
N−1∏
j=1
ν
(
pi, piij
)
+ (−1)N+1
N∏
i=1
ν (pi, pii) .
Therefore, upon using this expansion in Eq. (3), the linearity of mathematical
expectation E [•], and the notation φa (pi) := E [ν (pi,Πa)], we have:
E [ν (pi,Σ)]
=
(
N
1
)
E [ν (pi,Πa)] −
(
N
2
)
E [ν (pi,Πa)]2 + . . . + (−1)N+1 E [ν (pi,Πa)]N
=
(
N
1
)
φa (pi) −
(
N
2
)
(φa (pi))
2
+ . . . + (−1)N+1 (φa (pi))N
= 1−
(
1− φa (pi)
)N
(4)
as the expression for the simplicity of the password pi for the attacker. By ex-
amining this form of password simplicity we make the following observations:
1. Password simplicity is affected by the length of the attack-campaign: for
0 < φa (pi) < 1 the longer the attack-campaign the more likely the attacker
is in being successful. This follows from the function 1−
(
1−φa (pi)
)N
be-
ing a strictly monotonically increasing function of N , and the following limit.
1−
(
1− φa (pi)
)N
→ 1 as N →∞ .
Consequently, if the security system limits the number of tries an attacker has
to validate password guesses this, in turn, limits the length of an attacker’s
attack-campaign. Many online password-based security systems implement
this sort of limitation, but a significant number still do not.
2. The probability of an attack succeeding affects password simplicity : the more
likely an attacker is at guessing the password in a single attack, the more
likely the attacker is at being successful in a random attack-campaign. For,
if 1 ≥ x ≥ φa (pi) ≥ 0, then the following inequality holds.
1−
(
1− x
)N
≥ 1−
(
1− φa (pi)
)N
.
The probability φa (pi) takes into account the knowledge an attacker has, as
well as the method by which the attacker chooses a password to be used in
an attack.
3. Password Strength: Given the distribution for an attacker’s password-choice,
the Shannon-entropy
−N log2 [1− φa (pi)] .
By definition, each password pi chosen by a user has an associated simplicity,
E [ν (pi,Σ)], for a given attacker. Consequently, there is a natural notion of a
simplicity function for the attacker: for each password pi, the simplicity function
θ (pi) gives the probability that the attacker successfully guesses the password in
a random attack-campaign.
θ (pi) := E [ν (pi,Σ)] (5)
The simplicity function makes apparent the idea that some passwords are
easier to guess than others for a given attacker. There is also a dual relationship:
a given password chosen by a user could be easy for some attackers to guess but
difficult for other attackers. So, different attackers have different simplicities.
Since θ (pi) is defined on P, the user-policy and attacker-policy have the
following implications for password simplicity:
1. Those passwords that a user will not choose from will be of no use to the
attacker, even if those passwords are very simple for an attacker to guess
had they been chosen by the user.
2. Those passwords that an attacker will not choose from have associated sim-
plicity of 0, and hence are the best passwords for a user to choose from.
3. Simple passwords that a user may choose from hold the most potential for
the attacker being successful.
4 Password Policy and its Effects on Users
Password policies have a clear effect on users. For example, some password-based
security systems implement a user-policy that puts a time limit on the validity of
a password chosen by a user. In effect, for a user to continue to access computing
resources, the user has to choose a new password after a fixed amount of calender
time has elapsed. Rationale for such a policy include:
1. Limit the time an attacker has to penetrate the system
2. Limiting the time a successful attacker has “unauthorised” access to com-
puting resources.
We all live with such expiration policies, and many of us complain about
having to change our passwords “too often”. We are generally told that we have
to live with this for “added security” but there is rarely any quantitative evi-
dence that security is added. The models we have proposed can be instantiated
for any given situation to establish whether or not there is value in such a pol-
icy. Unsurprisingly, whether there is additional security or not depends on the
assumptions made about the relationship between the user and attacker profiles.
To illustrate this point consider the following counterexample to claims of pass-
word expiration being beneficial. Let Φi be the random variable (1− φa (Πi))N
that models an attacker failing to guess a user password Πi in N independent
consecutive attacks (we defined the function φa (pi) when proving Eq. (4)). Sup-
pose that upon being required to renew her password a user is increasingly more
likely to choose a simpler password with each new choice. So formally, given
m− 1 successive password choices pim−1, . . . , pi1 made by a user, the user being
more likely to choose a weak password in her mth choice, compared with her 1st
choice, is modelled by the following inequality.
E [Φm|pim−1, . . . , pi1]  E [Φ1] .
The rationale for this inequality is that in such a situation an attacker can
expect the passwords chosen to become simpler. As a consequence of this, the
probability that an attacker will fail to guess a users password after
m password choices by the user is much less than it would be if the user
chose only one password over the same time period. That is
E [ΦmΦm . . . Φ2Φ1] (E [Φ1])m ≤ E [Φ1m] .
5 Conclusion
Much of what we assume to be true in security is not, particularly when we
involve users! Our assumptions about policy improving security often turn out
to be untrue. We need a system of quantifiable reasoning, that allows us to make
informed decisions about the validity of policy choice, to ensure that we do get
the right balance of security and convenience. In particular, we have shown that
policies based only on one dimensional assumptions are likely to be erroneous.
For our simple case, we show it is necessary to take both user and attacker choices
into account to get a true understanding of vulnerability. We have proposed a
probabilistic framework for reasoning about policy, which allows such discourse.
In the future, we propose to extend this work to allow reasoning about more
aspects of security policy and the environment, including multiple attacker pro-
files. We also intend to develop user studies, allowing accurate instantiation of
the user based variables, leading to better overall understanding of the validity
of security policy change.
The next time your IT department says “we have changed our password policy
to increase security”, you can legitimately say “prove it”.
